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CHAPTER 1

Public Sector Labor Law:
An Update
JOHN LUND

University of Wisconsin-Madison
CHERYL L. MARANTO
Marquette University

Law governing collective bargaining rights of state and local government employees continues to be a crazy-quilt patchwork of state and
local laws, regulations, executive orders, court decisions, and attorney
general opinions. This patchwork is far from static. For labor relations
practitioners, academics, and policymakers alike, there is an ongoing
need to update the status of these laws. That is the objective of this
chapter.
To develop this update, a LEXIS® search of state and federal court
cases, laws, legislative proposals, and attorney general opinions for each
state was conducted from 1987 (the year the last IRRA research volume
on the public sector was published) through 1994. Additionally, several
CD-ROM literature databases, including a legal periodicals database as
well as the BNA Government Employment Relations Reporter, were
searched.
This chapter begins with a review of significant state legislative
changes as well as selected court deCisions, executive orders, and attorney general opinions since 1987 which affected collective bargaining
rights in the public sector. We then summarize current legal provisions
(the duty to bargain, terminal resolution procedures, and strike penalties) by state and sector (police and fire, state workers, etc.). Finally, we
review and analyze two key post-1987 trends: (1) legislative and constitutionallimitations on the finality of collective bargaining agreements or
interest arbitration awards and (2) procedures for handling nonmember
objections to agency shop fees in light of Hudson, 475 US 292, 121
LRRM 2793 (1986) and Lehnert , III S.Ct 1950, 137 LRRM 2321
(1991).
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Major Changes since 1987

Major State Legislative Changes
The seven-year period from 1987 to 1994 witnessed a relatively low
level of legislative activity with only 11 states enacting laws. 1 Only one
state (New Mexico) passed a comprehensive law granting bargaining
rights to public employees where no previous bargaining law existed. Nebraska's new law extends bargaining rights to state workers, and Texas law
gives localities the option of providing bargaining rights to police and firefighters. The remaining eight states amended existing bargaining laws at
the margins, and most (six) of these covered educational employees only.
Given the low level and limited nature of changes in state collective
bargaining legislation, it might be tempting to conclude that the legal
framework in the public sector is quite stable. However, as Hebdon (this
volume) points out, this apparent stability is largely an artifact of the fragmented structure of public sector bargaining law. Our later discussion of
limitations on the finality of collective bargaining agreements and "binding"
arbitration awards through judicial decisions and fiscal control measures
demonstrates that a great deal of flux exists beneath the stable veneer.
Table 1 summarizes these laws. Changes in administrative regulations
and proposed legislation are not included. Significant court decisions
interpreting existing law or regulations, executive orders, and attorney
... general opinions are reported later.

Significant Court Decisions Affecting Bargaining Rights
Since it is not possible to report all Significant court decisions here,
priority is given to decisions which affected the duty to bargain, terminal
resolution steps, the right to strike, and the finality of collective bargaining agreements and arbitration awards. Thirteen Significant state court
decisions regarding public sector bargaining are reported in Table 2. Five
concern the finality of ratified collective bargaining agreements or interest arbitration awards. These are discussed at some length in a separate
section on the finality issue. Three decisions relate to the legal status of
public employee strikes and are discussed in the summary of current state
law provisions. Finally, two decisions concern the legal status of interest
arbitration, and the remaining three deal with miscellaneous issues.

Significant Attorney General Opinions and Executive Orders
Perhaps the most significant attorney general opinion since 1987
involves the prohibition of public employee strikes in West Virginia.
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TABLE 1
New or Amended State Bargaining Laws since 1987
State

Coverage

Summary of Change

Alaska
(1992)

Public school
teachers

Allows public school teachers the right to strike
after submitting to advisory arbitration. (A 1982
Alaska Supreme Court decision had ruled that
teacher strikes were illegal under the old law. )

D elaware
(1994)

State, county &
municipal,
excluding
teachers, police
& firefighters

Expands mandatory subjects of bargaining to include wages and benefits.

Illinois
(1995)

Public school
employees,
Chicago only

Expands the list of prohibited bargaining subjects
(e.g., subcontracting, layoffs and their impact),
prohibits teacher strikes for 18 months, exempts
educational employers from requirement to submit to binding dispute resolution process, gives
principals sole authority to suspend and discipline teachers, position vacancies to be filled by
principal without regard to seniority.

Iowa
(1991)

Public school
teachers

Eliminates fact-finding from available impasse
procedures. If mediation fails, dispute goes directly
to final offer arbitration.

Michigan
(1994)'

Public school
employees

Imposes fmes on employees and unions for striking, prohibits unfair labor practice strikes, requires
courts to enjOin strikes and lockouts without finding of irreparable harm, prohibits labor organizations from vetoing contracts, prohibits requiring
association ratification, expands the list of prohibited bargaining subjects.

Nebraska
(1987)

State workers,
excluding
university
and college
employees

Twelve statewide bargaining units defined, contracts must expire with end of biennial budget
cycle, all negotiations must be completed by March
15. If no agreement by January 15, parties submit
to binding arbitration (special master) who must
rule by February 15. Arbitration decisions are appealable to the Public Employment Relations
Commission . No right to strike. Also see Appendix.

New Mexico
(1992)

All public
employees

State workers are automatically covered by the Public Employment Labor Relations Board (PELRB),
but nons tate jurisdictions may create a parallel
structure which is at least as effective as PELRB.
State workers contracts, if not settled by November 15 go to fact-finding, with recommendations

24

PUBLIC SECTOR EMPLOYMENT

TABLE 1 (Continued)
New or Amended State Bargaining Laws since 1987
State

Coverage

Summary of Change
due by December 10. If no agreement by December 15, unresolved issues are resolved by the appropriations process. Nonstate worker units may
develop alternative terminal resolution procedures.
Striking unions may be decertified for one year.

Pennsylvania
(1992)

Educational
employees

Parties negotiate a terminal resolution arbitration procedure which selects from either union,
employer, or factfinder final offers or recommendations, either issue by issue, economic and noneconomic packages, or total package. If fact-finding reco mmendations not totally accepted by
both parties, the terminal resolution procedure
takes effect, and parties give notification of their
intent to proceed to arbitration which is binding
unless either party rejects it. If either party refuses to select arbitration, a strike or lockout may
occur outside of a ten-day notice period. Rejection of the arbitration award frees them to
legally strike or lockout. Strikes are not permitted
from the time fact-finding is requested until the
report is made. Strikes must cease when the parties agree to arbitration. Selective strikes are illegal, and strikes which prohibit the school board
from providing the required number of days in
the school year may be enjOined. There are restrictions on the use of outside strikebreakers.

Texas
(1993)

Police and
firefighters
only

Enabling legislation requires cities to adopt the
law by referendum. Non-binding arbitration available. Strike penalties include union fmes, forfeiture of dues checkoff, and for striking employees, two years probation and no compensation
increase for one year after strike.

Utah
(1993)

Certificated
school employees
only

Mediation available after 90 days of negotiations
and if impasse occurs. If no mediated settlement
within 15 days , parties may submit to a state
hearings officer for fact-finding.

Wisconsin
(1993)

Certified
teaching
personnel

A revenue control measure adopted in 1993
(S.B. 16) amended the Municipal Employment
Relations Act (MERA) to require that, between
7/1/93 to 6/30/96, if a school district employer
offered a "qualified economic offer" to a union representing school district profeSSional employees,
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TABLE 1 (Continued)
New or Amended State Bargaining Laws since 1987
State

Coverage

Summary of Change
the parties would be precluded from arbitrating
economic issues. A "qualified economic ofle r"
(QED ) applies only to teachers union and must
maintain the percentage contribution toward
employees' existing fringe benefits and maintain
those fringe benefit costs which existed 90 days
prior to contract expiration (provided that the
costs of doing so are plus or minus 1.7% of total
compensation cos ts during th e pre¥ious 12
months ) and total wage cost increases, including
length of service and education increments do
not exceed 2.1% of total compensation costs during the previous twelve months.

, The circuit court has ordered a stay of implementation of the Michigan law,
declaring two sections to be unconstitutional (automatic fine of union for strike without determining union authorization and re quirement of automatic issuance of
injunctions against strikes). At this time, the case is on appeal.

This state currently lacks any legislation establishing the right of public
employees to bargain collectively. A 1962 state attorney general opinion
advised "public employees may join unions and government officials
may discuss wages and hours with such unions, but the final determination ... rests with the governmental authorities and cannot be delegated
away" (BNA SLL 1994, 59:220). A 1990 attorney general opinion to the
state superintendent of schools further advised, "[T]here is no right to
strike against the state . . , any strike or concerted work stoppage by
public teachers in this state is illegal." The attorney general stated that
in the absence of state laws, "[I]t is axiomatic that a strike by public
employees for any purpose is illegal under common law." In response to
the ongoing teachers strike, the opinion further advised that teacher
contracts expressly prohibited strikes; any teacher who participates in
one is subject to disqualification for one year, may be suspended and
forfeits ali due process protection (Attorney General opinion, March 8,
1990). The attorney general opinion conformed to a state Supreme
Court decision in Jefferson County Board of Education v. Jefferson
County Education Association, 183 W.Va. 15 (1990), which Similarly
found the same teachers strike was illegal.
Perhaps the most Significant executive order during this period was
issued by Governor Bayh of Indiana in 1990. Although the governor had
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TABLE 2
Significant Court Decisions Affecting Public Sector Bargaining Laws since 1987
State

Citation

Summary of Decision

Alaska

Public
Employees
Local 71 v.
State, Supreme
Court of Alaska,
775 P.2d 1062
(1989)

The legislature is free to choose not to fund the
monetary terms of a collective bargaining agreement signed by the state, but then the parties
may resume negotiations.

Colorado

Martin v.
MonteztlmaCortez School
Dist., Supreme
Court of
Colorado, 841
P.2d 237 (1992)

Applies the Industrial Relations Act (initially
passed in 1915) to public employees and grants
all public employees the right to strike. Under
the act, labor disputes are subject to the authority of the director of the division of labor, who
"may render a final order settling the dispute."
In Donlon v. Denver Classroom Teachers Assoc.,
Denver Dist. Ct. No. 94 CV 5055 (1994), the district court applied Martin to the Denver teachers
strike, ruling that teachers have the right to strike
and that the Commissioner of Labor surrendered
jUrisdiction when he presented a compromise contract which he sought to impose and the union
rejected.

Florida

State v. Florida
Police
Benevolent
Assn., Supreme
Court of
Florida, 613 So.
2d 415 (1992)

Public employee unions requested judicial review
of the legislature's unilateral changes in leave
policy in a collective bargaining agreement. The
court ruled that the legislature is free to underfund an agreement (due to separation of powers)
and, in so dOing, is then free to unilaterally
change any monetary item in the contract. The
court rejected the unions' request for renegotiation as being "administratively untenable."

Iowa

AFSCMEllowa
Cotlncil 61 v.
State, Supreme
Court ofIowa,
484 N.W. 2d
390 (1992)

Unions brought action to enforce an arbitration
award after the governor vetoed an appropriations bill funding the award . The legislature
. failed to override the veto. The state contended
. that it could not fund the awards due to budget
constraints, and that it was not bound by the
award because it is subordinate to the appropriations process (due to separation of powers and
the constitutional prohibition against undue delegation of duties). In ordering the state to pay,
the court ruled that by passing PERA, the state
made itself bound by its labor contracts . The
claimed shortage of funds "can be ascribed to
discretionary funding choices."
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TABLE 2 (Continued)
Significant Court Decisions Affecting Public Sector Bargaining Laws since 1987
State

Citation

Summary of Decision

Louisiana

Davis v. Henry ,
Supreme Court
of Louisiana,
555 So. 2d 457
(1990)

The cou rt ruled that public sector employees are
covered by the state's "Little Norris LaGuardia
Act" which protects "all employees in the exercise of their right to engage in concerted activities." The court rejected the school board's argument that public e mployee strikes are illegal
under common law (since Louisiana is not a
common law state) and found that the state constitution gives public employees "the same right
to e ngage in collective bargaining a~ held by
their counterparts in the private sector." Except
for police strikes which by their nature endanger
the public, public employee strikes are legal and
not enjoinable absent factual findings of danger
to public health and safety.

Michigan

MEA v. Engler,
Wayne County
Circ. Ct., 94423581-CL

Nebraska

Nebraska v.
Nebr. Assn. of
Public Employees
Local 61,
Supreme Court
of Nebraska
239 Neb. 653
(1991)

New
Hampshire

Furlough ,
Supreme Court
of New
Hampshire, 135
NH 625 (1992)

Unions challenged the constitutionality of five
provisions of new amendments to PERA dealing
with public school employees. The court found
two provisions unconstitutional: (1) automatic
fines against the union without determination of
union knowledge/support or authorization, and
(2) requirement of courts to enjoin school strikes
without finding of irreparable harm. The circuit
court issued a stay of the entire law's implementation. Currently on appeal.
This case arose not out of the bargaining law but
the state's Uniform Arbitration Act. The union 's
contract with the state required final and binding
arbitration regarding terms and conditions of
employment; a similar clause required binding
arbitration of grievances. The state supreme
court found final and binding arbitration of both
contracts and grievances to be unconstitutional,
because it ousts the courts of jurisdiction.
The N.H. Supreme Court was requested by the
state House of Represe ntatives to d etermine
whether a pe nding bill, HB 1058-FN, which
would require state employees to take unpaid
leaves of absence in response to a state fiscal crisis, would violate the state employee collective
bargaining agreement. The court found the proposed law did impair the collective bargaining
agreements despite the state's assertion that no
minimum amount of work was guaranteed. The
court also rejected the state's argument that such
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TABLE 2 (Continued )
Significant Court Decisions Affecting Public Sector Bargaining Laws since 1987
State

Citation

Summary of D ecision
a decision to furlough was within the purview of
management rights and finally that this action
was within the "emergency" provisions of the
contract. The N.H. Supreme Court also rejected
the proposed bill on constitutional grounds.

New Jersey

Hillsdale, 622
A.2d 872
(N.J. Super, A.D.
1993)

Two police arbitration awards were challenged
by two cities on the theory that the arbitrators
did not adequately address all eight statutory criteria governing awards (34:13A-16g). The New Jersey Supreme Court vacated both decisions see
below).

Oklahoma

Del City v.
Fraternal Order
of Police Local
114, Supreme
Court of
Oklahoma, 869
P.2d 309 (1993)

Oklahoma's Supreme Court invalidated Sections
51-65 of the Police and Fire Law which provided
for an "evergreen" clause allowing negotiated
settlements to "roll over" for an additional year if
no contract settlement was reached. The cit)'
argued that to continue to pay negotiated salaries
and benefits from the previous fiscal year would
create a budge t deficit which would violate a
state constitutional provision requiring a threefifths referendum to increase indebtedness above
revenues. The Oklahoma Supreme Court agreed.

• '" Pennsylvania

Masloff v. Port
Authority,
Pennsylvania
Supreme Court,
531 Pa. 416
(1992)

Port Authority transit workers in Pittsburgh
struck in 1992, and the city of Pittsburgh (not a
party to the dispute) obtained an injunction citing a "clear and present danger" to public health
and safe ty. Two issues were involved in the
appeal: (1) did the city have standing to file for
the injunction; and (2) was a clear and present
danger established? The court ruled that the city
did have standing to file. Relying upon rulings
under the PERA, the court found that although
"[Olrdinary inconveniences resulting from a
strike don't by themselves establish a clear and
:present danger," there was one in this case. The
court ordered the union and the Port Authority
into court-supervised negotiations only because
binding arbitration had been removed by a 1986
amendment to the Port Authority law.

South
Dakota

Rapid City,
Supreme Court
ofS. Dakota
522 N.w.2d
494 (1994)

Under §3-18-8.1 of the South Dakota law, school
boards may implement their last offer eleven
days after impasse is reached, unless state intervention is requested. FollOwing impasse, Rapid
City's board of education implemented its final
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TABLE 2 (Continued )
Significant Court D ecisions Affecting Public Sector Bargaining Laws since 1987
State

Citation

Summary of Decision
offer, A union's unfair labor practice charge alleged
one implemented provision of the school board's
final offer was even more restrictive than state
law, The state supreme court held this action was
not an unfair labor practice ,

Texas

Beaumont,
Texas Court of
Appeals, 763
SW2d57
(1992)

A city ordin ance which originally authorized
binding inte rest arbitration was subseque ntly
repealed by the voters, The union brought suit
claiming the repealing ordinance conillcted with
state law by removing the provision for binding
arbitration, The court of appeals found no conflict, since binding arbitration is not required by
the act.

promised to pursue legislation providing collective bargaining rights to
state workers, a bill to do so, as well as two other bills (one relating to all
public employees and one to police and firefighters only), all failed passage, The state workers' bargaining bill was withdrawn from consideration in the senate, after passing the house, on the grounds that it might
necessitate a statewide tax increase, Although the governor lacked the
jurisdiction to mandate bargaining rights, the executive order grants
state workers the right to elect union representation. An election will be
scheduled following a shOwing of sufficient interest. The order prohibits
strikes, strikers are subject to dismissal, and participating unions lose
recognition by the state (Government Employment Relations Reporter,
June 4, 1990, p. 699). Despite the lack of a bargaining duty and the
absence of terminal resolution procedures, at least three contracts covering state workers have been negotiated since the order was issued
(CERR, June 13, 1992, p. 968),
Current State Collective Bargaining Law Provisions
The Appendix summarizes the variations in state requirements with
respect to the duty to bargain, terminal resolution procedures, and strike
penalties affecting different public employee groups. Here we present
summary tabulations of the prevalence of those legislative provisions.
Table 3 reports the prevalence among states of laws which mandate a
bargaining duty (as defined in Sec. 8{d) of the LMRA) by sector. Eleven
states continue to have no legislation granting public employees bargaining rights, while twenty-three states and the District of Columbia grant
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bargaining rights to all public employees, and sixteen states grant bargaining rights to only some public employees.
TABLE 3
N umber of States' with Legislative Bargaining Duty, 1994
Employee Group
All public employees
All but state employees
Police, firefighters, and education
Education and municipal
Education only
Police and firefighters only
None

Number of States
24

3
2
2

5
4
11

• Includes the District of Columbia.

The top panel of Table 4 summarizes strike policies governing public
employees by sector. Sixteen states have legislation that explicitly prohibits strikes by all public employees, and all but four of these specify
one or more penalties for striking. Not surpriSingly, police and firefighters are most frequently subject to strike prohibitions (31 states and
D .C.). State, education, and municipal employees are fairly equally subject to strike prohibitions (20, 23, and 21 jurisdictions, respectively).
Police and firefighter strike prohibitions are most likely to have speci'.. fied penalties attached (22 jurisdictions), with educational strikes close
behind (19 jurisdictions). On the other hand, ten states now permit
strikes by all public employees except police and fire with no or minor
restrictions.2 One state (Colorado) permits strikes by all public employees. Three of the states which permit strikes have laws which are silent
on the issue (in fact, two lack enabling legislation entirely), but their
state supreme courts have ruled that public employee strikes are legal
(County Sanitation Dist. No . 2 of L.A. County v. L.A. County Employees Assoc. , 699 P.2d 835, 838 [1985], in California; Davis v. Henry,
555 So. 2d 457 [1990], in LO,uisiana; and Martin v. Montezuma-Cortez
School Dist. , 841 P.2d 237 [1992], in Colorado).
The type of terminal resolution procedure is summarized in the lower
panel of Table 4 for each state and sector. (See Appendix for additional
detail.) The designations in Table 4 reflect the mandatory, explicit, and
final step of the statutory bargaining dispute resolution procedure; the
format of the terminal step (e.g., what type of arbitration) is not specified
here. Unless the statute clearly indicates that the terminal step is mandatory, the next lower and mandatory step (e.g., fact-finding or mediation) is
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TABLE 4
N umbe r of States' with Various Strike Policies and Terminal Resolution Procedures
Police &
Firefighters

State

Education

Municipal

Number of States with Various Strike Policies b
Allowed without
restriction
Allowed with
minor restrictions
Prohibited, no pe nalty
specified
Prohibited, with
penalties specified
Total states with
strike policy

2

3

3

3

1

8

9C

9

10

6

4

7

22

14

19

14

35

31

35

33

N umber of States by Terminal Resolution Procedure
Silent
17
23
15
Mediation
5
9
9
Fact-finding
6
13
19
Interest arbitration
22
5
8

21
9
15
6

Notes:

• Includes the District of Columbia.
b The number of states with a strike policy does not equal the number with a legislated bargaining duty because: (1) some laws are silent on strike policy, and (2)
some states which lack a bargaining law have strike policies established via judicial
decisions.
C A new law in Illinois covering only Chicago schools prohibits strikes for 18
months but is being challenged in the courts. Illinois is still coded as allowing strikes
in education with minor restrictions.

reported. In some cases, the law authorizes the parties to jOintly agree to
a terminal resolution procedure but does not clearly indicate what would
happen if the parties fail to reach agreement on a terminal step. In these
cases, the next lower mandatory terminal step is reported in this table.
A second definitional problem occurs in determining whether the
terminal step is binding. Clearly mediation and fact-fmding, by definition, are nonbinding. Interest arbitration is presumed to be binding, but
in several states, the legislature or governing body has the ability to
override portions of an arbitration award or portions of the award are
nonbinding. (For example, in Rhode Island the award is advisory only
on all economic issues and is binding on noneconomic issues only if a
majority of the arbitration panel concurs.) Rather than seek to resolve
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this definitional problem, the lower panel of Table 4 indicates whether
arbitration is mandatory but not whether the arbitration award is binding. The diversity of arbitration provisions among states prevents adequately capturing such detail in a summary table. The Appendix provides such detail.
As the lower panel of Table 4 indicates, public sector bargaining laws
are often silent on the terminal dispute resolution procedure, with that
"silence" being most prevalent for state employees and then for municipal
employees. When the terminal procedure is speCified, it is most often
fact-finding, followed by interest arbitration, and then mediation.
Mandatory interest arbitration is by far the most common terminal resolution procedure for police and firefighters (22 jurisdictions), whereas
fact-finding is the most common procedure for teachers (19 jurisdictions).
"Silence" is most common for state and municipal workers, although if a
terminal resolution procedure is specified for them , fact-finding is most
common for both groups. Interest arbitration is the least common resolution procedure for state, education, and municipal employees.

Finality of Collective Bargaining Agreements and Interest
Arbitration Awards: Legislative Overrides and Imperatives

In a period of tightening government budgets and broad public opposition to tax increases, an issue of increasing importance in public sector
.~ bargaining is whether and under what conditions the monetary terms of a
collective bargaining agreement or an arbitration award are binding on
the employer. Presently there is no clear trend among states on this issue.
We first review recent court cases and attorney general opinions dealing
with the question of whether the legislative body can override voluntary
bargaining settlements or arbitration awards. We then examine recent
legislation which Significantly alters terminal resolution procedures.
Four state courts have found that collective bargaining contracts ratified by the state or arbitration awards do not constitute binding obligations on the state and its legislature, and four state courts and an attorney general's opinion have found that ratified and funded collective
bargaining contracts or arbitration awards do bind the state, at least
under the fact situations presented in the cases. Since states have different collective bargaining statutes and state constitutions, it is difficult to
generalize beyond these cases.
Among the cases in which courts (or the attorney general) found
that collective bargaining agreements are binding obligations, four are
based on the contract clause of the U.S. Constitution. Association of
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Surrogates v. State of New York , 588 N.E.2d 51 (N.Y. 1992), dealt with a
challenge to a new law that would withhold five days' pay from both
unionized and nonunionized personnel, to be paid as lump sums when
employees quit or retired, in order to offset a state budget shortfall. The
court found that this legislation violated the contract clause of the U.S.
Constitution, which prohibits states from passing any law impairing the
obligation of contracts (U.S. Const., Art. I, sec. 10, cl.[1]). Specifically,
the court found that the impairment created by the "payroll lag" was
substantial, inasmuch as the payment deferral could be for many years,
and that such a measure was not reasonable or necessary to accomplish
an important state purpose because the state had many alternative ways
to raise or save revenue.
In Carlstrom v. State of Washington, 694 P.2d 1 (Wash. 1985), the
state legislature initially appropriated sufficient money to fund its collective bargaining agreements, then later canceled the wage increases
contained therein after declaring an economic emergency. The Carlstrom court found that this law unconstitutionally impaired the collective bargaining agreements. The impairment was unreasonable given
that the state was aware of financial problems before entering into the
contracts and these problems changed in degree but not in kind during
this period. "An economic emergency may be properly considered, but
it is just another factor subsumed in the overall determination of reasonableness" (694 P.2d 1, 5). Additionally, the Carlstrom court reasoned
that the state could have, but failed to, include a clause in the contracts
which speCifically made wage increases contingent on legislative
approval (although the contracts did state that the agreements are subject to all present and future acts of the legislature).
In Furlough , 135 N .H . 625,609 A.2d 1204 (1992), the N ew
Hampshire Supreme Court issued an opinion in response to the legislature's inquiry as to the constitutionality of a proposed law which would
have required all state employees, including those covered by collective
bargaining agreements, to take unpaid leaves of absence. The New
Hampshire court also found that the U.S. Constitution's contract clause
prohibits states from enacting such a law since the law does constitute a
substantial impairment, unless it is reasonable and necessary to serve an
important public purpose. The Furlough opinion concluded that such a
law was neither reasonable nor necessary, since many alternative means
of dealing with the fiscal problem were available (though perhaps less
politically feasible), and because a state cannot conside r impairing its
contract obligations on par with other policy alternatives.
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In 1989 the Connecticut attorney general (Conn. AG LEXIS 5) was
asked by the senate president and speaker of the house whether a law to
decrease or delay COLA adjustments of state employees "notwithstanding existing contracts or pending contract negotiations" would violate
state or federal law. The attorney general advised that such an enactment would violate the u.s. Constitution's contract clause unless the
state could show severe fmancial emergency (Le., an important public
purpose), that the emergency was not foreseeable when the contract
was agreed to, and that no alternative methods of meeting the fiscal crisis would have less impact on contractual obligations. These four decisions and the attorney general's opinion suggest that, in the absence of
specific language in state public sector bargaining laws which conditions
monetary items of ratified contracts on sufficient legislative appropriations, the contract clause of the u.s. Constitution provides some protection against abrogation of contractual wage increases and payments for
which appropriations had been made during the term of the agreement.
The important role of state public sector bargaining statutory provisions is highlighted by AFSCMElIowa Council 61 v. State of Iowa, 484
N.W2d 390 (Iowa 1992). This case involved interest arbitration awards
for state employees which the legislature funded. The governor lineitem vetoed the appropriation funding the awards. The legislature did
.,!lot override his veto. The unions then petitioned the court for enforce- inent of the arbitration awards. The state argued it was not bound by the
awards because they are subordinate to the appropriations process. Because of the governor's successful veto, the appropriation was never
made. The state further argued that the constitutional requirement for
separation of powers prevents arbitrators, as members of the judiCiary,
from spending public money. In rejecting these arguments, the Iowa
Supreme Court ruled that when the legislature passed the Public Employment Relations Act (PERA) in 1974, it expressly made itself bound
by its contracts. There is no provision in the Iowa law, as there is in
other states, which expressly makes the monetary terms of a collective
bargaining agreement subject to funding through legislative appropriations. Sec. 20.17(6) of PERA states:
No collective bargaining agreement or arbitrator's decision
shall be valid or enforceable if its implementation would be inconsistent with any statutory limitation on the employer's funds,
spending or budget or would substantially impair or limit the
performance of any statutory duty by the public employer.
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The court rejected the state's claim that Sec. 20.17(6) made the contracts unenforceable, given the budget difficulties the state was facing.
The court found that all limitations or impairments suggested by the
state were under the control of the state, "[Tlhe shortage of funds , at
least to the extent of liability on these contracts, can be ascribed to discretionary funding choices" (484 N.W.2d 390,395). Although the governor had the power to veto the appropriations bill, this veto did not erase
the state's obligation.
Alliance v. Secretary of Administration, 597 N.E.2d 1012 (Mass.
1992), closely parallelled the fact situation in AFSCME but yielded an
opposite result. Five collective bargaining agreements were signed by the
state secretary of administration; the legislature appropriated sufficient
funds to finance the cost items of the agreement, but the governor
vetoed the appropriations bill. His veto was not overridden. The Massachusetts Supreme Court found' that, in the absence of the governor's signature, no valid appropriation was made, so the contracts were not binding on the state. There are, however, critical statutory and contractual
differences between AFSCME and Alliance. Unlike the Iowa law, Sec. 6
of the Massachusetts bargaining law provides, "[Ilf the appropriate legislative body duly rejects the request for an appropriation necessary to
fund the cost items, such cost items shall be returned to the parties for
further bargaining." All contracts also stated that the cost items would
not become effective unless sufficient appropriations were enacted.
In State of Nebraska v. Nebraska Assoc. of Public Employees Local
61 (Neb. 1991), the Nebraska Supreme Court declared the state's
Uniform Arbitration Act unconstitutional. The law authorized binding
arbitration of future disputes and contract clauses providing for binding
arbitration. The court found that these provisions violated Article 1, Sec.
13 of the Nebraska Constitution, which states that "[alII courts shall be
open, and every person, for any injury done to him in his lands, goods,
person or reputation, shall have a remedy by due course of law." The
court cited a long history of cases indicating the Nebraska judiCiary'S
zealous guarding of their jurisdiction. It is unlikely that other states
would be influenced by this holding.
Two cases in Florida and Pennsylvania which found that collective
bargaining contracts did not bind the public employer have potentially
far-reaching implications for public sector collective bargaining in those
states. In State v. Florida Police Benevolent Assoc. , 613 So.2d 415 (Fla.,
1992), the Florida Supreme Court ruled that public employee collective
bargaining agreements are subject to legislative appropriations. Further,
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if the legislature fails to appropriate sufficient monies to fund the monetary items of an agreement, it can unilaterally alter any monetary contract provisions without a requirement to return the issues to the parties.
The court said that requiring further negotiations would be "administratively untenable." The Florida PBA court effectively skirted the fact
that public workers also have a constitutional right to bargain collectively
in Florida. Art. 1, sec. 6 of the Florida Constitution states: "[T]he right of
employees, by and through a labor organization, to bargain collectively
shall not be denied or abridged." The court reasoned that allOwing the
legislature to unilaterally change contract terms does not abridge collective bargaining rights but instead reflects "an inherent limitation due to
the nature of public bargaining itself," given the separation of powers
doctrine (613 So.2d 415,419).
Florida PBA arguably represents a major departure from Florida
precedent. In Dade County Classroom Teachers Assoc. v. Legislature of
Florida , 269 So.2d 684, 685 (Fla. 1972), the Florida Supreme Court
held that, except for the right to strike, public employees have the same
right to collective bargaining as do private employees. Furthermore, the
Dade County CTA court "threatened to impose judicial guidelines if the
legislature failed to pass" enabling legislation. Thus, historically, the
Florida Supreme Court had actively encouraged public sector employee
bargaining rights . Dissenting in the Florida PBA case, Justice Kogan
noted that the court previously ruled that a refusal of a public employer
to honor contractual provisions involving money was an abridgement of
the constitutional right to collective bargaining and, thus, required a
shOWing of compelling state interest to be sustained (Hillsborough
County Governmental Employees Assoc. v. Hillsborough County, 522
So.2d 358 (Fla. 1988). No such shOWing was required in this case.
However, Florida PBA did not expliCitly overturn Hillsborough, reasoning that Hillsborough was inapplicable because the legislative exercise of
appropriations power is not an abridgement but an inherent limitation
of public sector bargaining. Justice Kogan stated,
I would hold that Article' I, section 6 imposes upon the legislature, at a minimum, a duty to seek renewed negotiations with
unions whenever the legislature decides to ignore the governor's negotiated agreement with those unions .... To say otherwise would render Article I, section 6 meaningless for public
employees (613 So.2d 415, 424) .
At least three states have used fiscal control measures to impair the
fmality of collective bargaining agreements or interest arbitration awards
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or to block access to interest arbitration. In Wilkinsburg Police Officers
Assoc. v. Commonwealth, 636 A.2d 134 (Pa. 1993), unions challenged
the constitutionality of the Pennsylvania Financially Distressed Municipalities Act, which requires a city so designated to develop a recovery
plan which may include changes to existing collective bargaining agreements. The law further prohibits future collective bargaining agreements
which violate a recovery plan's provisions. The law does not mention any
contracts, other than collective bargaining agreements, in its provisions.
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court ruled that this law is constitutional,
despite Art. 3, sec. 32(7) of the Pennsylvania Constitution which reads:
"The General Assembly shall pass no local or special law.... Regulating
labor, trade, mining or manufacturing" [emphasiS added] . The Wilkinsburg court ruled that this prohibition simply requires that a statutory
classification have a rational relationship to a proper state purpose. It
found that the purpose of the law is to "ensure fiscal integrity of municipalities" and that the classification is rationally related to that purpose
because only municipalities in poor financial condition are subject to the
act. The court justified the selective inclusion of collective bargaining
contracts by noting that by passing the Public Employment Relations Act
(PERA), the state already regulates labor contracts to the exclusion of
nonlabor contracts. Justice Papadakos dissented, noting that the law
"effectively permits municipalities to adopt recovery plans which unilaterally determine the limits of future collective bargaining agreements
and awards (including the reduction in salaries or benefits) without any
meaningful input by the employee organization" (636 A.2d 134, 140). He
further suggested the law regulates collective bargaining agreements to
the exclusion of any other contracts and should be declared unconstitutional: "[T]he Act effectively suspends collective bargaining and places
all union employees in the category of nonunion, at-will employees of
the municipality" (636 A.2d 134, 141).
In Hillsdale PBA Local 207 v. Bourough of Hillsdale, 622 A.2d 872
(N .J. Super. A.D . 1993), the court found that compulsory public sector
interest arbitration will not pass constitutional muster unless arbitrators
confine themselves to a very strict reading of all eight arbitral decisionmaking criteria in the statute. The unions argued that the statute gives
arbitrators considerable discretion, as it states that the arbitrator's award
must be "based on a reasonable determination of the issues, giving due
weight to those factors listed in N.J.S.A. 34:13A-16(g) which are judged
relevant for the resolution of the specific dispute" (622 A.2d 872, 880)
(emphasis added). The court rejected the unions' argument:
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Without proper consideration of the legislative standards, public interest arbitration may very well be an undue delegation of
legislative authority. It may be that in public sector interest
arbitrations the parties fail to present evidence on some factors .... However, the public interests at stake in public sector
arbitration are and must be paramount and demand more
attention to the statutory factors than an unsupported passing
reference .. . the interest arbitrators must detail in their opinions the specific reasons why an enumerated factor is not
"judged relevant" (622 A.2d 872,883-884).
The Hillsdale court took particular aim at the arbitrators' heavy weighting of comparability and minimal weighting of the Local Government
Cap Law (which prohibits cities from increasing appropriations by more
than 5% over the previous year). "Indeed, an arbitrator's consideration
of a town's Cap situation is mandated by the Constitutional proscription
against undue delegation of legislative authority to individuals" (622
A.2d 287, 881). As displeasure with the fiscal impact of interest arbitration awards grows, more states may turn to the courts to impose a
stricter adherence to all statutory arbitral criteria, and/or pass revenue
control laws that directly constrain interest arbitration awards and collective bargaining agreements.
To our knowledge, to date only Wisconsin has enacted legislation
"': which Significantly reduces access to existing arbitration procedures.
Initiated temporarily by Wisconsin Act 16 and made permanent by the
state budget bill in 1995, school boards can avoid interest arbitration on
economic issues for professional school employees by offering a "qualified economic offer" (QEO). An offer is a QEO if it contains combined
salary and benefit cost increases 3.8% above the previous year. Step
increases must be included in calculating the cost increase. The statute
requires the parties to use forms developed by the Wisconsin Employment Relations Commission (WERC) to determine wage and benefit
cost increases. This law alsO' put a cap on the amount of increase 'in
school spending, thus, Significantly limiting school boards' ability to pay,
even in the absence of QEO limits. The 1993 law also contained a sunset provision which would have eliminated interest arbitration for all
muniCipal employees except police departments of large cities, fire
departments, and city and county law enforcement agencies. Fact-finding would then become the only terminal resolution procedure. Despite
Significant sentiment in the legislature and by the governor to allow the
interest arbitration prOvision to sunset, the 1995 budget bill ostenSibly
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removed the sunset provision, thus restoring interest arbitration in those
sectors. The bill's final language is so unclear that it can be interpreted
as repealing interest arbitration for all municipal employees except
teachers, although this was clearly not the intent. Seizing the opportunity, three counties supported by the Wisconsin Association of Counties
have filed declaratory judgment actions seeking a judicial determination
that the compulsory interest arbitration provision of the Municipal
Employment Relations Act no longer applies to any employees except
school district professional employees (e.g., Juneau County v. Courthouse Employees Local 1312 AFSCME, Highway Dept. Employees
Local 569 AFSCME, and Professional Employees AFSCME , Juneau
County Circ. Ct., 95 CV 214). While these cases are pending (at this
writing), several counties are refusing to submit interest disputes to
arbitration. Should the court rule in the counties' favor, it is conceivable
that the legislature would refrain from reversing the ruling legislatively.
Agency Shop Fees

Case Law
Unions in the public sector, like their private sector counterparts,
have sought to further their financial and institutional stability through
union security provisions. Whether referred to as "fair share" or "agency
shop," these provisions, once negotiated into a collective bargaining
agreement, require individuals to join the union or remain a nonmember but pay some agency fee or fee for service, which generally approximates union dues. While agency shop and fair share clauses have
become more prevalent in public sector contracts, at least in jurisdictions which do not outlaw such forms of union security (e.g., the socalled "right-to-work" states), so too have legal challenges from objecting nonmembers who have been required to pay fair share dues.
In this section, the legal framework for challenges by objecting fair
share payers is briefly reviewed. Two central issues emerge from these
legal challenges: (1) exactly what union expenses beyond the core functions of collective bargaining and representation are "chargeable" to
objecting fair share payers, and (2) what procedural safeguards must be
established by the union to allow objecting fair share payers to receive
the nonchargeable fees and/or to challenge the reasonableness of the
union's determination of what is chargeable. We begin with a brief discussion of these substantive and procedural issues through several U.S.
Supreme Court decisions. We then review several lower and state court
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decisions which have applied these precedents to different fact situations. Concurrent with the development of case law, at least eight states
have codified many or all of the substantive and procedural requirements developed by the U.S. Supreme Court. It seems likely that such
codification will continue as substantive and procedural issues become
settled law.
For workers in the public sector, the Supreme Court confirmed the
constitutionality of agency shop or fair share fee provisions in Abood v.
Detroit Board of Education, 431 US 209, 95 LRRM 2411 (1977), where
several nonmember fair share payers objected that the agency shop provision interfered with their freedom of association rights under the First
and Fourteenth Amendments. Relying upon a series of Railway Labor
Act cases, the Court held that any such interference was constitutionally
justified, as the "desirability of labor peace is no less important in the
public sector, nor is the risk of free riders any smaller in the public sector" (431 US 209, 224). However, the Abood Court limited the use of
such fair share fees.
We do not hold that a union cannot constitutionally spend
funds for the expression of political views, on behalf of political candidates or toward the advancement of other ideological
causes not germane to its duties as collective bargaining representative. Rather, the Constitution requires only that such
expenditures be financed from charges, dues or assessments
paid by employees who do not object to advancing those ideas
and who are not coerced into doing so against their will . . .
(431 US 209, 235--36). (Emphasis added.)
The Abood Court noted the dividing line between chargeable and
nonchargeable activities was "somewhat hazier" in the public sector than
in the private sector but declined to draw any distinction between the two
types of activities given the lack of evidentiary record. In a later Railway
Labor Act case, Ellis v. Railtl.!ay Clerks, 466 US 435, 116 LRRM 2001
(1984), the Court developed and applied two tests to determine whether
expense categories were chargeable to objecting fair share payers: (1)
Were the expenditures "necessarily or reasonably incurred for the purpose of performing the duties of an exclusive representative of the
employees in dealing with the employer on labor-management issues"
(466 US 435, 448), and (2) Did they "involve additional interference with
the First Amendment interest of objecting employees, and if so, were
they adequately supported by government interest" (466 US 435, 456).
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The U.S. Supreme Court, in Chicago Teachers Locall v. Hudson,
475 US 292, 121 LRRM 2793 (1986), then further developed procedural
safeguards to prevent agency fees being used to subsidize ideological and
political activities by objecting nonmembers. In Hudson the union automatically rebated to all nonmember employees 5% of total dues paid as
nonchargeable expenses. The union also established an appeals procedure whereby nonmembers could appeal the amount or percentage used
to determine nonchargeable expenses. The Hudson Court held:
The constitutional requirements for union collection of agency
fees include: (1) an adequate explanation of the basis for the
fee; (2) a reasonably prompt opportunity to challenge-the
amount of the fee before an impartial decision maker; and (3)
an escrow for the amounts reasonably in dispute while such
challenges are pending.
The Hudson Court clearly stated that the burden is on the objecting nonmember to challenge the determination of what is chargeable. However,
before this objection can be made, the union must first provide adequate
information enabling the nonmember to make an intelligent objection.
In Lehnert v. Ferris Faculty Association, III S. Ct. 1950, 137 LRRM
2321 (1991), the Supreme Court revisited the chargeability determination left open in Abood (and partially answered in Ellis): What is the
dividing line between chargeable and nonchargeable expenses? The
majority set forth the following three requirements: (1) the expense
must be germane to collective bargaining, (2) the expense must be justified by a policy interest in labor peace and avoidance of free riders, and
(3) it must not Significantly add to the burdening of free speech that is
inherent in the agency or union shop.

Lower Court Cases
A number of federal and state court cases since 1986 have applied
Hudson and Lehnert to applicable state law and collective bargaining
situations. In a procedural case, Mitchell v. L.A. Unified School District,
140 LRRM 2121 (CA 9, 1992), the Ninth Circuit held that affiTTlUltive
consent of nonmember agency fee payers is not required to protect
their First Amendment rights; these rights are adequately protected as
long as they are given the opportunity to object to such deductions. The
court cited with approval the California Supreme Court's decision in
Cumero v. Public Employment Relations Board, 132 LRRM 2575, 49
Ca1.3d 575 (1989), which stated that it was the objecting nonmember's
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obligation to object. " It must be affirmatively asserte d or else it is
waived" (140 LRRM 2121, 2124). In other words, rebates are given only
to those fair share payers who object.
The Mitchell court held the union's notice procedures adequately
protected First Amendment rights . The union sent two notices to nonmember agency fee payers advising them that they were obligated to
pay the full fee unless they objected in writing within thirty days to paying for nonrepresentational union activities and that the cost of union
representational activities accounted for 84.6% of the agency fee.
In Albro v. Indianapolis Education Association, 140 LRRM 2406
(1992), the Indiana Court of Appeals dealt with the substantive issue,
finding that the teachers union failed to meet its burden of proving the
proportion of expenses which were chargeable. The union's method of
establishing chargeable expenses did not provide adequate information
to enable the objecting nonmember to intelligently challenge the determination, thus improperly shifting the burden to the objecting nonmember. The Albro court also made detailed delineations among the
types of expenses which are chargeable, relying on Lehnert. Lobbying
expenses unrelated to collective bargaining are not chargeable, nor are
political and charitable contributions, even if they are de minimis in
amount. Public relations expenses were also found not chargeable,
despite the union's contention that it may charge for internal public
relations relating to activities within the bargaining unit. Expenses
~. incurred by state and national affiliates for litigation not brought on
behalf of the bargaining unit are not chargeable. "Defensive" organizing
also failed to survive Lehnert's three-part chargeability standard, as the
Albro court found no free rider problem associated with defensive organizing and charging for activities to convince members to remain part of
the union adds Significantly to the burden on free speech. The expenses
for prOviding benefits to union members only are not chargeable, and
expenses for affiliation with state and national bodies are chargeable
only if these concern activities that the local can prove are otherwise
chargeable and will ultimately benefit nonmembers of the union. The
court in Albro also ruled that Lehnert must be applied retroactively.
A hybrid procedural and substantive case was presented in Browne v.
WERe , 140 LRRM 2647 (1982), where the Wisconsin Supreme Court
considered an appeal challenging the Wisconsin Employment Relations
Commission's (WERC) finding of an unfair labor practice against several
unions for deducting fair share fees without first providing all the procedural safeguards reqUired under Hudson. On the substantive issue, the
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union's notice to nonmembers dis aggregated intermediate-level union
exp enses into 38 separate categories , indicating those which were
chargeable and those which were not. The audited statement of the
intermediate union body was used to derive a percentage of chargeable
to total expenses, which was then applied to the local union's expenditures. On the procedural question, the notice to nonmembers stated that
objecting nonmembers had thirty days following its posting each year to
object to the use of fair share funds for the payment of nonchargeable
expenses. The objector would receive advance rebate of this amount.
Once such an objection was made, 100% of the challenger's fair share
payments were put in an escrow account. All challenges were consolidated into a single hearing before an impartial arbitrator. The union paid
the cost of arbitration and bore the burden of proof for the accuracy of
the charge ability determination. Escrowed amounts were disbursed pursuant to the arbitrator's decision.
Both the nonunion objectors and the union appealed a myriad of
procedural and substantive questions. Objectors challenged the determination of the chargeability of certain categories of expenses in light of
Lehnert. They also challenged the adequacy of procedural safeguards
(the notice to members, fairness of the hearing, the escrow account) and
the legality of the employer deducting the full amount of fair share fees
without ascertaining that the union's procedure incorporates the requisite safeguards.
On the (substantive) chargeability issues, the Browne court held that
public relations expenses, which involved "public advertising of positions
on the negotiation of or provisions in the bargaining agreement and representation matters," were chargeable. Lobbying for collective bargaining legislation and regulations was chargeable, but lobbying for other
political, charitable and ideolOgical matters was not. Extra-unit litigation
dealing with jurisdictional disputes, impasse resolution and concerted
activity, and collective bargaining was not chargeable based on Justice
Blaclanun's reasoning that such activities are more akin to lobbying than
bargaining unless they are "germane" to the affected bargaining unit.
The Browne court also found organizing expenses to be nonchargeable.
The Browne court then turned to the procedural issues under
Hudson . The court did not find any constitutional defect in the union's
challenge procedure. But it did take exception with the chargeability
determination, particularly the automatic application of the chargeability percentage of the intermediate body to the local union's expenses.
The court agreed that a random sampling of expenses by an auditor
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would be sufficient to create a presumption for the percentage; a fullblown audit would therefore not be necessary to make this determination for the local union. The court also found fault that the escrow for
the challengers' fair share fees was totally controlled by the union, ruling that a more independent escrow was required. Finally, the court
ruled that the employers did not commit an unfair labor practice by
automatically deducting the fair share fees and that the facts of the situation warranted a retroactive application of Lehnert.
In Gwirtz v. Ohio Education Association, 887 F.2d 678, 132 LRRM
2650 (CA 6, 1989), six nonmember teachers claimed the union's procedure was not constitutionally sound because it failed to prOvide sufficiently detailed financial information supporting the chargeability of
expense categories. The appellants argued that the notice, which contained the Audited Basic Statement and Audited Supplemental Schedule
of the intermediate and national bodies shOWing chargeable expenditures, was insufficient, and that the "highest" available level of auditing
service was required by Hudson. The Sixth Circuit disagreed, arguing
that Hudson did not require "absolute precision in the calculation of the
charge to nonmembers" and that the union "need not provide members
with an exhaustive and detailed list of all its expenditures." Rather, adequate disclosure in such cases requires only "the inclusion of major categories of expenses, as well as verification by an independent auditor"
(475 US at 307).
The Kentucky Supreme Court in Housing AuthOrity of Louisville v.
Service Employees Local 557, 93-SC-397-DG, 1994 Ky. LEXIS 119
(1994), let stand an arbitrator's ruling that the employer violated the contract by failing to withhold the full dues amount from nonmembers without speCific written authorization from the nonmember. Relying upon
Hudson, the Kentucky court held that it is the objecting nonmember (and
not the public employer) who is responsible for challenging union disclosure regarding chargeable and nonchargeable expenses and that the
adoption of such procedural :safeguards is a matter between the union
and the nonmember employees, not the employer and the union. Indeed,
the "concerns expressed by HAL [the employer] about the constitutional
rights of its nonunion employees may be well intentioned but lack the
legal authority reqUired of standing to bring a lawsuit on that basis alone"
(1994 Ky. LEXIS 119 at 04-5). Moreover, the court stated that the record
did not establish any indication that the union engaged in any "extraneous
political or ideological activity of any sort."
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Two central issues have been addressed in this section: (1) what
union expenses are chargeable to the objecting fair share payer's dues,
and (2) what procedural safeguards must be instituted by the union for
objectors. Chargeability challenges will now be resolved by applying a
specific fact situation to the .three basic principles set forth in Lehnert:
(1) the expense must be gennane to collective bargaining, (2) it must be
justified in terms of labor peace and avoidance of free riders, and (3) it
must not significantly impair free speech. As can be seen from the
Wisconsin and Indiana cases, sometimes the same type of expense is
found to be chargeable by one court yet not by another. Clearly, the
determination of what is chargeable will turn on the facts in e'idence in
each case, applying the three-part test of Lehnert.
The procedural safeguards required for objectors appear relatively
clear. The union must give adequate written notice to all nonmembers,
with sufficiently detailed information to make an intelligent decision
whether to challenge the chargeability percentage. However, this information need not be the most detailed that is available. Estimates of
chargeability from one level of the union applied to another will not
meet the standard if Browne is applied. Rather, a same-level audit is
required. Further, the challenged funds must be escrowed by a third
party, a hearing must be held in which the evidence is considered, and a
neutral third party must make a ruling. Any awards will probably be
applied retroactively. Finally, the employer need not assess the adequacy of the procedural safeguards or the chargeability determination.

State Laws Dealing with Agency Shop Objectors
At least eight states have already codified procedures for how agency
fee objectors will recover rebates for nonchargeable expenses under
Lehnert and Hudson. These provisions appear to incorporate the substantive and procedural prinCiples elaborated in the decisions reviewed
above, with some variation. Pennsylvania's law, which became effective
in June 1993 requires that as
a precondition to the collection of fair share fees, the exclusive
representative shall establish and maintain a full and fair procedure, consistent with constitutional requirements, that provides nonmembers, by way of annual notice, with sufficient
information to gauge the propriety of the fee and that responds
to challenges by non members to the amount of the fee. The
procedure shall provide for an impartial hearing before an
arbitrator to resolve disputes regarding the amount of the
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chargeable fee. A public employer shall not refuse to carry out
its obligations on the grounds that the exclusive representative
has not satisfied its obligation under this subsection.
If a challenge is filed, the union must pay for the arbitration, which will
be conducted pursuant to American Arbitration Association rules .
Moreover, use of this procedure does not preclude constitutional challenge. Finally, the law requires that all materials and reports filed pursuant to it are public records, and violations of these provisions are subject to a fine of not more than $2,000.
Under New Jersey law, the representation fee for nonmembers covered
by an agency shop provision cannot exceed "85% of the regular membership dues, fees and assessments." The law further establishes a "demand
and receive" provision whereby any objecting nonmember can demand
a return of any part of that fee paid by him or her which represents the employee's additional pro rata share of expenditures by the majority representative that is either in aid of
activities or causes of a partisan political or ideological nature
only incidentally related to the terms and conditions of employment or applied toward the cost of any other benefits available only to members of the majority representative. The pro
rata share subject to refund shall not reflect however the costs
of support of lobbying activities designed to foster policy goals
in collective negotiations and contract administration or to
secure for the employees represented advantages in wages,
hours and other conditions of employment in addition to those
secured through collective negotiations.
The demand and receive system provides that nonmember objectors
may obtain review of the chargeable and nonchargeable amounts by a
three-member review board whose members are appointed by the governor. The burden of proof falls on the union.
In Ohio, under §4117.09(c) of the public sector bargaining statute
passed in 1983, all public sector labor organizations representing public
sector employees must devel~p an internal procedure to determine the
rebate which conforms to federal law and where a timely demand is
made by the member. This section further provides that objecting nonmembers not satisfied with the determination may appeal it within
thirty days to the State Employment Relations Board which will rule
whether the determination was arbitrary or capricious.
California's Dills Act, Section 3515.8 protects the right of an objecting fair share payer to demand and receive any part of the fee "used for
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partisan politics or ideology incidentally related to terms or conditions of
employment." Costs of lobbying to promote policy goals or to secure improvements in wages, hours, and working conditions, in addition to those
which are negotiated, are not subject to refund, according to the law.
In Delaware, Section 4019 of the Public School Employment Relations Act gives school districts authority to deduct fair share fees from
noncertified personnel. It requires an "adequate explanation" of the basis
for the fee, an opportunity to challenge the fee amount before an impartial decisionmaker, and further requires that an escrow account be used
to deposit amounts in dispute.
Hawaii's law permits payroll deductions of nonmember fees only if
the union has a procedure for determining the amount of rebate based
on the pro rata share of expenditures of a political or ideological nature.
The law provides a right to petition to object to the amount refunded.
Section 115 of the Illinois Education Labor Relations Act provides
that fair share fees must exclude fees used for political purposes. When
an employee objects, the fair share amount must be placed in an escrow
account.
Finally, Massachusetts requires unions to establish a rebate procedure based on: (1) the pro rata share of expenditures on political contributions; (2) lobbying on legislation not directly related to the bargaining
unit; (3) charitable, religiOUS or ideological contributions; and (4) benefits not germane to governance or duties as the bargaining agent.
At least eight states have sought to codify to some extent the procedural safeguards set out in case law. Additionally, some states have
expliCitly identified what expenses are chargeable (Illinois, New Jersey,
and California); some utilize more general guidelines, and others contain no gUidelines at all. The development of procedural safeguards in
state law appears to mirror developments in the case law, including
notice requirements and development of internal union procedures.
The developme nt of state law and administrative regulations help
unions bring their own internal procedures into line with case law.
While it is difficult to predict the future, it is likely that several other
states will follow suit, either through administrative rules or legislation.
Summary and Conclusions
Only eleven states have enacted new legislation governing public
sector bargaining since 1987, and most laws have applied to only one or
two sectors. Seven of these laws can be characterized as enhanCing collective bargaining rights. Only one state (New Mexico) passed enabling
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legislation covering all public sector employees during this period. Education has received the most legislative attention: Six laws relate solely
to education, and five focus on terminal resolution procedures for teachers. Currently 39 states have enabling legislation for at least one sector,
and 23 states and the District of Columbia have laws covering all public
employees. Education is most likely to have enabling legislation (36 jurisdictions) , followed by police and fire (33), municipal (29), and finally
state employees (24). Forecasting future legislative developments is
always hazardous. If the pattern of activity over the last decade were to
continue, we would see primarily marginal increases in coverage, expanding to previously uncovered sectors. Such expansion of coverage is
likely to encounter obstacles, as in Nevada, where the governor vetoed
enabling legislation for state workers, and in Indiana, where the governor issued an executive order providing less than full bargaining rights
when he was unable to get enabling legislation adopted for state workers . Indeed, coverage is likely to continue to lag most for state workers
as it is the sector in which the old obstacle of nondelegation of authority
continues to exert the most influence.
There is no discernible trend in the legal treatment of strikes in the
public sector. Indeed, since 1987 the right of public employees to strike
has been enhanced in at least three states (legislatively in Alaska and
judicially in Colorado and Louisiana) and prohibited in three (legisla... tively in New Mexico and Texas and judiCially in West Virginia). The
judicial activity is particularly intriguing in this area. Absent enabling
legislation, the Colorado and Louisiana Supreme Courts have granted a
very broad right to strike to public employees by extending laws previously thought to apply only to the private sector (the Industrial Relations Act in Colorado and the "Little Norris-LaGuardia Act" in Louisiana) to the public sector. Equally interesting is the absence of legislative
initiatives in these states to reverse these decisions. In stark contrast, the
West Virginia Supreme Court found no public employee right to strike,
in the absence of enabling' l~gislation, through the application of cammon law. It is particularly difficult to predict future trends in this area,
given such widely opposing developments.
Twenty-one states and tlle District of Columbia now have mandatory
arbitration for firefighters, and twenty have it for police. There is considerable diversity in the type and choice of terminal resolution procedures used. For example, choice of arbitration methods is a feature of
the laws in Ohio and Pennsylvania, among others, and several states now
permit the parties to include the fact-finder recommendations as one
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package of three from which the arbitrator may choose. There has been
relatively little legislative action on interest arbitration.
The status of the finality of ratified collective bargaining agreements
and arbitration awards appears to be one area with a great potential for
change. While the contract clause of the u.s. Constitution appears to
provide at least some protection against the abrogation of ratified and
funded collective bargaining agreements, there appears to be little or no
legal safety net for ratified contracts or even arbitration awards before
they are funded through the appropriations process (the Iowa case
being a notable exception). The right of the legislature to refuse to fund
economic items in ratified contracts or "binding" arbitration awards is
legislatively established in a number of states, including Alaska, Connecticut, Florida, and Rhode Island. But the Florida case which allows
the legislature to unilaterally change economic items in ratified agreements which they underfund suggests even greater vulnerability for collective bargaining itself, should other state courts choose to adopt it as
precedent. Binding interest arbitration may also come under increasing
assault, both legislatively and judicially. Wisconsin's new law limits
access of teachers to the arbitration process by effectively imposing a
specified rate of increase (through its definition of a "qualified economic
offer"). The law's confusing language has opened the doors to a legal
challenge to interest arbitration for all nonteacher employees. Judicially,
the New Jersey case, which requires a rigidly strict adherence to all arbitral criteria in the statute as well as the Local Government Cap Law,
also provides a potential precedent which other state courts could adopt
in order to limit the latitude and, thus, the fiscal impact of interest arbitration awards. A number of states have passed fiscal control measures
which Single out collective bargaining agreements. The Pennsylvania
court upheld such a law which restricted both current and future collective bargaining agreements.
A number of federal and state court cases decided since Lehnert and
Hudson have addressed a myriad of fact situations dealing with procedural and substantive issues involved in dues rebates for objecting fair
share payers. A significant number of states have passed laws governing
this process, and so far, these laws have been applied without Significant
legal challenge. It appears that litigation over rebate amounts and procedures will diminish as more states pass such laws.
Education has been the focus of legislative changes over the last
seven years, presumably because the direct impact of educational
spending on property taxes has generated the strongest fiscal pressures
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in that sector. The impact of impending federal budget cuts and the
simultaneous devolution of responsibility for the administration of welfare-related programs to the states with less federal money will surely
increase the fiscal pressures on states. Thus it is reasonable to predict
that legislative attention will turn increasingly to the state sector. It is
also likely that fiscal control measures focused on the local level which
single out collective bargaining agreements (such as those in Pennsylvania and New Jersey) will become more common in the future.

Endnotes
I Virginia passed a law in 1993 which expressly prohibits public employee bargaining despite the law's redundancy with a 1977 Virginia Supreme Court decision
that local gove rning bodies could not negotiate in the absence of express statutory
authority (Partridge, in press). Since this law does not enable bargaining, it is not
included in the above count of new statutes or their summary below.

2 Minor restrictions include requiring a notice period before striking and the possibility of an injunction in cases of clear and present danger to public health and safety.

APPENDIX
Definitions for Appendix Table

Sector:
Police and firefighters

Primarily sworn and/or uniformed officers, excluding
state police and nomworn police and fire employees
such as dispatchers.

State employees

All employees of the state, except employees of a
higher education and/or community college system.

Primary and secondary
school teaching and
nonteaching personnel

Noted where nonteaching personnel are excluded
from coverage.

Municipal employees

EmpJoyees of municipal and county government, excluding police and fire employees.

Duty to bargain:

This is an either/or proposition as to whether the law
provides for a bargaining duty at least as extensive as
that under Section 8(d) of the Labor-Management
Act of 1947, as amended. Does the law impose the
duty to meet and confer at reasonable times over
wages, hours, and other conditions of employment
and a good faith duty to bargain? If any of these elements are missing, this sector was listed as "no."
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Terminal resolution
procedures':
0=

1

=

2=
3=
4=
5=
6=

7=
8=
9=

10=
11=
12 =
13 =
Strike penalties:
0=
1=
2=
3=

6=

7=
8=
9=
10 =

11=
12 =
13 =

No provision explicitly mentioned.
Mediation.
Voluntary fact-finding.
Mandatory fact-finding.
Fact-finding with review/override by legislative body.
Final-offer interest arbitration- total package.
Final-offer interest arbitration-economic and noneconomic packages.
Final-offer interest arbitration-issue by issue.
Interest arbitration---other format.
Interest arbitration--choice of procedures._
Parties determine terminal resolution procedure.
Final resolution by legislative body.
Other method.
Voluntary arbitration.
No provision explicitly mentioned.
Strikes allowed without restriction.
Strikes allowed following notice period.
Strikes allowed but with the possibility of injunctions
where clear and present danger to public health and
safety exists.
Strikes prohibited with no explicit penalties.
Strikes prohibited with injunctions specifically mentioned.
Strikes prohibited with employee fines.
Strikes prohibited with employee discipline.
Strikes prohibited with fmes against union.
Strikes are possible unfair labor practices.
Union loses payroll deduction if illegal strike.
Bargaining duty suspended if union engages in illegal
strike.
Union decertified if illegal strike.
Other.

• To the extent possible, this is the single code which best characterizes the present state of the law
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Summary of Current F eatures of State Public Sector Bargaining Laws, by Sector
Police & Firefighters
TRpb

SP"

AL

0

7

AK

Yes

8

5

AZ

No
No
No l

N/A
N/A

N/A
N/A

No

AR

0

4

CA

PIS Education

State Employees

BD'
No l

State

MuniCipal

TRp b

SP"

BD'

TRp b

SP"

No

N/A

N/A

Yes

13

N\A
12

No
Yes

N/A
N/A

N/A
N/A

No

1

34
6

BD'

No
No l

TRp b

N/A

BD'
No l

N/A

4

13

13

Yes

13

F

N/A
N/A

N/A
N/A

No

No

N/A
N/A

N/A
N/A

Yes

2

34

1

34

6

6

No
Nos

SP"

."

c::
t""
....

1:1:1

~

CIl

CO

No

N/A

1

No

N/A

1

No

N/A

1

No

N/A

1

CT

Yes

7

4

Yes

77

4

Yes

7

5

Yes

7

4

DE

Yes

2

5,6,8

Yes

2

5,6,8

Yes

2

5 ,6,8

Yes

2

5,6,8

==

Yes

5B

5,9

Yes

B

5 ,9

:::."

DC
FL

Yes
Yes 10,11

GA

Yes l2

,-r

6

B

5 ,9

3,11

5,6,7,8,
9,10,12

Yes ll

3,11

1213

4

No

N/A

5

3,11

5,6 ,7,8,
9,10,12

Yes ll

3,11

5 ,6,7,8,
9,10,12

No

N/A

N/A

No

N/A

N/A

Yes
Yes IS

3,13

2,3
417

Yes

3,13

2,3

2

No

N/A

N/A

Yes
Yes 20

2,13

2,3

Yes

2

2,3

3

10

NO

Yes

7

5 ,6,7,8,
9,10,12

Yes

Yes

8

3,13

2,3

3

5
115

Yes

Yes l2

No

N/A

N/A

IL

Yes

7

4

2

2,3

N/A

N/A

Yes
NO l9

0

7,12

3,7

5 ,6,7,8,
9,10,12

Yes

3,7

5 ,6,7,8,
9,10,12

NO

IA

Yes

,-r

Yes ll

HI

IN

5

5 ,6,7,8,
9,10,12
7 14

ID

IB

,-r

' BD = bargaining duty, ~RP = terminal resolution procedure, CSP = strike penalties

IB

N/A

N/A

3,7

5 ,6,7,8,
9,10,12

trI

..,
~

0

trI

t""

0

~

trI

~

APPENDIX TABLE (Continued )
Summary of Current Features of State Public Sector Bargaining Laws, by Sector
Police & Firefighters
State
KS
KY
LA

ME
MD
MA
MI
MN
MS
MO
MT
NE
NV

NH
NJ
NM
NY
NC
ND

BD
NO l.2 l
Yes l2
No
Yes
No 12.24
Yes
Yes
Yes
No
No
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
No
No

TRP
3,11
2

N/A
2,1323

SP
5,9
4
4

0
9
78
9,13

9
0
5
4
9

N/A
N/A

N/A
N/A

8
1,227
8
4
9,10
3
8

0
4
6,7,8
4,9
0
5,12
6,8,10

N/A
N/A

N/A
N/A

PIS Education

State Employees
BD
No l

TRP

SP

3,11

5,9

No
No
Yes
No
Yes
Yes
Yes
No
No l
Yes
Yes
No
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
No
No

N/A
N/A

N/A

2,1323

36
9

N/A

N/A

3,13
1
9,13

5
4
226

N/A
N/A

N/A

3,13
127

4
0
4

N/A

N/A

4
3
4
4

4,9
1
5,12
6,8,10

N/A
N/A

N/A
N/A

BD
22

Yes
No
No
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
No
No
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
No
Yes 29

TRP

Municipal

SP

BD

TRP

3,11

5,9

N0 1.2l

3,11

5,9

N/A
N/A

N/A

No
No
Yes
Yes2.5

N/A
N/A

N/A

2,1323
2
3,13
1
9,13

36
9
10,12
5
4
226

N/A
N/A

N/A
N/A

3,13
1,227
8
4
3
4
4

0
4
6,7,8
4,9
1
5,12
6,8,iO

N/A

N/A

3

6

Yes
Yes
Yes
No
No l
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes

2,1323
3
3,13
1
9,13

N/A
N/A

SP

36
9
10,12
5
4
226

N/A

Yes 2B

3
4
3
4
4

4
0
4
6,7,8
4,9
1
5,12
6,8,10

No
No

N/A
N/A

N/A
N/A

3,13
1,227

5

0

"
~

..,'"

til

APPENDIX TABLE (Continued )
Summary of Current Features of State Public Sector Bargaining Laws, by Sector
Police & Firefighters
State

BD

OR
OK
OR
PA
RI

WI

Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
No
Yes
No
Yes 33
No
Yes
No35
Yes
No
Yes

WY

Yes l 2

SC
SD
TN
TX
UT

vr
VA
WA

WV

SP

BD

TRP

7

530
8
8
8

5
6
4
0
4

N/A

N/A

Yes
No
Yes
Yes
Yes
No
No
No
No
No
Yes
No35
No36
No
Yes
No

5,6,8

N/A

N/A

8

6,8,10

N/A

N/A

3,13

3,9

N/A

N/A

8

5,8

N/A

N/A

9

5,6,8,1
0
0

8

PIS Education

State Employees

TRP

""-

Municipal

SP

BD

TRP

SP

BD

TRP

3,10

2,3

N/A

N/A

3,13
3,13

2,3
6,11
2,3

2,3

N/A

3,10
3
3,13
9,10
831

3,10

N/A

3,13
3,13

2,3

"C

3
4

t"'
....

N/A

N/A

N/A

I ,ll

3

5,6,8
5,9

t!\
C"l
>-l

N/A

N/A

3
4

0
3

N/A

N/A

4

4

N/A

N/A

3

6,9

Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
No
Yes
Yes 32
No
Yes
Yes
No35
Yes
No
Yes37

N/A

N/A

No

8

2,3
3
4

N/A

N/A

31

1

5,6,8

N/A
N/A
N/A

N/A
N/A
N/A

5

9

N/A

N/A

3,13

0

N/A

N/A

5

5,6,8,10

Yes
No
Yes
Yes
Yes
No
Yes
No
No
No34
Yes
No35
Yes
No
Yes

N/A

N/A

No

3
4

31

8

N/A

SP

5,6,8

N/A
N/A
N/A

N/A
N/A
N/A

3,13

3,9

N/A

N/A

3,4

4

N/A

N/A

5

5,6,8,
10

N/A

N/A

c:::
~

C"l
~

0

~

t!\
~
"C
t"'

0

~

t!\

~
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Notes:
1 Right to present proposals/meet and confer.
2 Excludes snow removal, public utility and sanitation workers, jail, prison and
hospital employees.
3 Requires majority vote plus submission to advisory arbitration before a strike.
4 The laws are silent on the right to strike, but a 1985 Cal. Sup. Court decision
ruled that public employee strikes (other than firefighters and law enforcement personnel) are not unlawful at common law unless or until a substantial and imminent
threat to health and safety is clearly demonstrated. (County Sanitation Dist. No. 2 v.
L.A. Coonty Employees Assoc., 1985 ).
5 Although the Meyes-Milias-Brown Act states that Memoranda of Agreement
(MOUs ) are not binding, the Cal. Sup. Ct. ruled in 1975 that a city council's ratification of an MOU bound the city to grant the wage increases contained in the MOU
(City Employees Assoc. v. City of Glendale, 1975). However, a 1991 AG opinion cites
a 1978 Cal. Sup. Ct. case as stating that the meet and confer "process is not binding"
(L.A. County Civil Service Comm. v. Superior Court, 1985).
6 In 1992 the Colorado Supreme Court ruled, in Martin v. Montezuma-Cortez,
that public employees have the right to strike. In 1990 the Louisiana Supreme Court
ruled in Davis v. Henry that public employees have the right to strike.
7 Connecticut State Employees Relations Act provides for inte rest arbitration
awards, which can be rejected by the legislature if it finds insufficient funds . The
parties then resume negotiations.
B Economic items.
9 Noneconomic items.
10 Police and firefighters may be determined by PERC to be managerial employees exempted fTOm coverage.
11 The right of public employees to bargain collectively is a constitutional as well
as a statutory right.
12 Firefighters only.
13 Called mediation but like fact-finding.
14 While there is no law conferring the right of state employees to bargain, there
is a law which specifically prohibits state employees from striking.
15 The Idaho Supre me Court ruled that, while strikes during the contract are
specifically prohibited by law, firefighters have a "residual right" to strike after the
expiration of a contract (Firefighters v. City of Coeur d'Alene, 100 LRRM 2079, Id.
Sup. Ct., 1978).
16 Cove rs certificated professional employees only.
17 No mention in law regarding strikes, but a 1977 Idaho Supreme Court decision
ruled that strikes are illegal under the law, though such illegality does not automatically require issuance of an injunction (Oneida School Dist. v. Education Assn. , 95
LRRM 3244, Id. Sup. Ct. , 1977).
18 Indiana's Public Employees Collective Bargaining Act was declared unconstitutional in 1977 because it prohibited judicial review of IERB's bargaining unit determinations. It was formally repealed in 1982.
19 Gove rnor Bayh issued an executive order on May 20, 1990 granting state
employees the right to elect union representation.
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20 Only salary, wages, hours, and wag~- related fring~ ~enefits are mandatory subjects of bargaining. Othe r working conditions are permissive.
2 1 Contains a "local option" provision. Political subdivisions (other than the state)
must elect to be bound by the provisions ofPERA.
22 Though the law says "meet and confer," the state supreme court ruled the law
requires negotiation and, that once a contract is ratified , the parties are bound by it
(NEA v. Shawnee Mission Board of Ed. , 84 LRRM 2223, Kan. Sup. Ct. 1973).
23 Arbitrator's award regarding economic issues is advisory; if majority of arbitrators on panel agree to the award on noneconomic issues, it is binding.
24 Permits voluntary collective bargaining.
25 Covers city of Baltimore only.
26 Minnesota: Other conditions for lawfu l strikes include prior participation in
mediation and neither party has requested interest arbitration. State employees may
also strike if the legislature rejects or fails to ratifY a negotiated agreement or arbitration decision.
27 Nebraska: The Nebraska State Supreme Court has ruled that contractually
based and statutory binding arbitration-both interest and rights types-under the
State Uniform Arbitration Act, are an unconstitutional intrusion into the authority of
the courts (see AFSCME Local 61 infra.).
28 New York: New York City has its own ordinance which allows submittal of
impasse items to final and binding arbitration.
29 North Dakota: Applies to teachers only. A binding interest arbitration referendum was defeated in 1992.
30 Oklahoma: If the city's final offer is not accepted by the factfinder, the city may
submit its last best offer to the voters in a referendum .
3 1 Rhode Island: All interest arbitration awards are advisory only on wages.
32 Tennessee: Applies to certificated school employees only.
""; 33 Texas : Each municipality must fust enact an ordinance authorizing police and
firefighter bargaining. This ordinance may include final and binding interest arbitration.
34 Utah: While there is no law authoriZing municipal employee bargaining, Salt
Lake City does have a local e mployee bargaining ordinance.
35 Virginia: The law provides, "No state, county, municipal or like governmental
officer, agent or governing body is vested with or possesses any authority to recognize
any labor union or other employee association as a bargaining agent of any public
officers or employees or to collectively bargain or enter into any collective bargaining
contract with any such union or association or its agents with respect to any matter
relating to them or their employment or service."
In 1993, a section was added to permit the formation of employee associations
"for the purpose of promoting their interest before the employing agency." Teachers
and public employees have a grievance procedure established by statute.
36 Washington: State employees cannot negotiate wages. There is also a separate
law for marine employees covering employees of the Washington State Ferry System
which has its own Marine Employees Board which prOvides research, grievance
administration and fact-finding assistance.
37 Wisconsin : In 1993 the law was amended to cap the total economic package
that could be accepted by an arbitrator at 3.8% per year (see Table 1).
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